Water Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 8

9-1-1999

A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969
Melinda Kassen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969, 3 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 58 (1999).

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COLORADO'S WATER
RIGHT DETERMINATION AND ADMINISTRATION
ACT OF 1969
MELINDA KASSEN:
I.
II.

Introduction ..................................................................................
Court-Based Water Allocation .......................................................

M.
IV.
V.

Augmentation Plans .....................................................................
62
Maximum Utilization, Beneficial Use, and the Public Interest ......... 64
Conclusion ....................................................................................
69

I.

58
59

INTRODUCTION

In taking stock of the 1969 Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969 ("Act") on its thirtieth anniversary, even a
critique must take note of its many positive features. Most important
as a substantive matter, the Act integrated the administration of
surface and ground water.' Too many of Colorado's sister states in the
West continue to ignore the hydrologic facts supporting such
integration to the detriment of resource protection or meaningful
administration.
The procedural innovations of the Act-water
divisions, judges and referees, the rolling adjudication, and the
tabulation and abandonment lists2--are so much a part of today's
working status quo that few recognize them any longer as
revolutionary. As a policy matter, with its adoption of the doctrine of
maximum utilization of water, the Act reinvigorated a state system
described as "stagnant."3
The latter innovation, however, is not one that engenders
unanimous praise, even among water users and their advocates; the
Act did not incorporate most of the management techniques necessary
to make maximum utilization work in an accountable system. Such
practices should have included, "metered water, measured crop use,
strong management, waste control, and strict adherence to the
constitutional concept of public property."4 Viewed from the vantage

I Melinda Kassen is the Western Water Project Colorado Office Director for
Trout Unlimited.
1. David L. Harrison & Gustave Sandstrom, Jr., The Groundwater-Surface Water
Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 28-29, 38 (1971).
2. See Gary L. Greer, A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law, 47 DENV. L.J.
181 (1970).
3. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 24-25.
4. Id. at 24.
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of one concerned about protecting Colorado's magnificent aquatic
resources and about fostering open decision-making processes, the
Act is deeply flawed.
The Act's failings derive from conscious decisions on the part of
the legislature, both to include features that perpetuated the status
quo and to reject reforms. This commentary will focus on three such
issues. First, the Act failed to take the opportunity to change
Colorado's archaic court-based system into an administrative permitbased one.
Second, by creating the new tool of "plans for
augmentation, ''5 the Act paved the way for further depletions of overappropriated streams, thereby, in many cases, stressing the
environment beyond its capacity to sustain living aquatic systems.
Finally, the Act's definition of beneficial use has led to severe and
unnecessary stress on aquatic ecosystems and resources. This has
occurred because the Act's drafters incorporated the state supreme
court's policy of "maximum utilization"7 of water without qualification
either by the addition of a public interest test or any requirement to
encourage conservation of the scarce water resource.
II. COURT-BASED WATER ALLOCATION

Of all the Western states, Colorado alone adheres to a purely
court-based system of adjudicating water rights. The Act did not
conform Colorado's system to the permit systems used elsewhere.
Apparently, no true consideration of this reform ever occurred; the
legislature even defeated a modest proposal to increase the authority
of the state engineer.9 By 1969, those analyzing the system dismissed
the possibility of such a transformation out-of-hand, asserting that,
after a century of court-based decision-making, it was too late for
Colorado to adopt a permit system.' ° In fact, the Act was "generally
characterized in terms of the absence of a clear delegation of
regulatory authority ....
[I]t set down a legislative policy in favor of
limiting direct regulatory authority to maintain the status quo with
regard to existing water rights."" The legislature chose not to impose
a regulatory system even though water experts conceded that the state

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(5) (1999).
6. For a description of the needs of healthy streams and ecosystems to all parts of
the hydrograph, see N. LeRoy Poff, et al., The NaturalFlow Regime, 47 BIOSCIENCE 769
(1997).
7. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (1999), derivedfrom Fellhauer v. People, 447
P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
8. SeeJohn Undem Carlson, Report to GovernorJohnA. Love on Certain Colorado Water
Law Problems, 50 DENV. L.J. 293 (1973).
9. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 44-45.
10. Id. at 25.
11. Id. at 37. Ironically, the authors noted that it was also generally the case that
consolidating authority in a water manager/administrator had many advantages,
including: "(1) more efficient use of water, (2) full development of the ground and
surface resources, (3) better production, (4) a more stable supply, (5) better
availability at times needed, and (6) improved quality." Id. at 44.
5.
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did have the authority to regulate such rights through the police
power.
The cumbersome mechanism of using the courts to adjudicate all
water matters has many disadvantages. First, the high costs and need
for representation in the court system limits the likelihood that certain
types of transactions will occur. Such costs create a barrier favoring
those with resources in disputed cases. 4 The closed nature of the
court system also generally minimizes public access to the process."
The courts also weaken the potential of Colorado's water market.
While it may not always be desirable to move water to money, powerful
arguments support the viewpoint that a truly open water market could
enhance stream protection.
Second, the court-based forum strongly discourages interested
members of the public (as opposed to water rights holders) from
participating in allocation decisions for this publicly owned resource.
This is so notwithstanding the fact that the Act changed the law to
allow any person to file a statement of opposition.
Barriers to
effective public participation arise not only from the high transaction
costs discussed above, but also from the fact that the system allows
non-water rights holders to raise only very limited arguments in
opposing water rights applications.' 8 Thus, for example, "changes [are
12. Carlson, supra note 8, at 321.
13. One example occurred in 1973 when the state legislature gave the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB" or "Board") the authority to appropriate water
without diversion to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999). In 1986, the legislature expanded the instream flow
program to allow the CWCB to acquire-by purchase or donation-instream flow
rights. Since passage of this statutory expansion, the Board has accepted over a dozen
donations of water. However, one recent donation of a water right valued at over one
million dollars cost $100,000 to effect in water court. Due to the high costs involved
with changing a right to allow an existing user to lease water to the Board, the Board
has not been able to establish a leasing program to augment the water rights it holds.
By contrast, Montana, which has a permit system, has an effective and active leasing
program.
14. The city of Minturn reportedly settled a case with Vail Associates by giving up a
water right because the town did not have the resources to defend its right in water
court. Steve Lipsher, Minturn, Vail Lawsuit Settled-Ski Resort Gains in Water Dispute,
DENY. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at B6.
15. In a case involving quantification of the U.S. Forest Service's reserved rights,
Trout Unlimited intervened in order to be privy to the proposed settlement. In re
United States, Case No. 81-CW-183, Water Division 3. While civil litigation typically
requires an entity to become a party to a case to engage in settlement, here the issue is
allocation of a public resource by government entities. Limiting the participation by
members of the public is not easy in an administrative forum. In most agency
proceedings, even where party status conveys certain privileges, any member of the
public can nonetheless participate before the agency at some level.
16. See generally CLAYJ. LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (1998).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(2) (1999). The statute states in relevant part that
"any person... who wishes to protest or support a ruling of the referee shall file in
writing a pleading ....
".Id.
18. Carlson, supra note 8, at 325-26. While the Act did expand standing, it did not
expand the arguments that persons could make in opposition to a new or changed
water right. Id at 326.
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not] restricted or denied in order to accommodate the proprietary
interest of the 'public' or the 'people' in water."' 9 All that a member
of the public can force by opposing an application is "strict proof' of
the facts necessary to support the new or changed right." This does,
however, include the ability of a member of the public to challenge an
applicant to prove water availability, or in the case of a conditional
right, that the applicant "can and will" be able to make the right
absolute.
Third, using a court-based system to determine appropriations of
water makes it substantially more difficult to integrate water quality
regulation with decisions about quantity. Where there is a single
administrative agency responsible for both sets of decisions, as is the
case for the Department of Ecolog in the State of Washington, for
example, integration simply occurs. Such integration makes sense in
light of the obvious connections between quality and quantity. While
in 1969 the federal Clean Water Act did not exist, a federal water
quality statute delegated substantial responsibility to the states.
Moreover, there is no evidence that in 1969, Colorado's legislature
considered incorporating environmental values in the Act.
And,
when given the opportunity to address quality-quantity integration a
decade later, the legislature responded by building a high wall
between regulation of water quality on the one hand and
administration of water rights on the other.25 The wall creates real,
adverse consequences to aquatic systems. As the Colorado Supreme
Court recognized, "this dual system limits the ability of both the water
court and the water quality control agencies to address certain water

19. Id. at 318.
20. Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739, 747 (Colo. 1997).
21. See In re Board of County Comm'rs, Case No. 88-CW-178, Water Division 4,
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, Judgment and Decree Order, (April 6, 1998); In re
Natural Energy Resource Co., Case No. 96-CW-257, Water Division 4, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, (May 28, 1998).
22. See PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (state
agency responsible for both water rights and water quality permitting imposes flow
requirements in a water quality certification).
23. Water Quality Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (prior to
1972 amendment by the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments, later renamed
the Clean Water Act).
24. The legislature did not adopt a provision providing any environmental
protection within the 1969 Act until 1973 when it created the state's instream flow
program. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999) (creating Colorado's modest
program for preservation of instream flows, following the threat of a citizen
referendum); Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd.,
594 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo. 1979) (upholding the Colorado statutory instream flow
program as constitutional).
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-104 (1999); see generally City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91(Colo. 1996) (state supreme court ruling that, beyond a
"general prohibition on unreasonable discharges, the system of water quality
regulation in Colorado reflects a continued conflict with and subordination to the
prior appropriation system," such that water judges may not consider many water
quality impacts in their decisions). But see discussion of the court's statements in
cases addressing the policy of maximum utilization, infra Part IV.
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quality issues... [or] provide remedies for all types of injuries. 6
Finally, courts, due to case-by-case determinations, fail as a forum
for effective water resource planning. Were an agency determining
water rights, that agency could also engage in resource management
and planning activities that might lead not only to greater efficiencies
in allocation of the resource, but also greater certainty.27 Neither in
1969 nor in the subsequent thirty years has Colorado's legislature
shown much interest in water resource planning. Thus, the choice to
continue Colorado's court-based system has been correct from the
standpoint of the state's legislative agenda, even though the natural
environment, necessarily sustained by waters within streams, suffers.
M. AUGMENTATION PLANS

One of the Act's major innovations opened over-appropriated
watersheds to additional appropriation through the use of "plans for
augmentation." 8 Any "sensible plan of water management which
increases the supply available for beneficial use will S ualify" provided,
of course, there is no injury to an existing water user.
Some augmentation plans have increased stream flows by putting
non-tributary ground water into a surface stream. The consequences
of these plans are neutral, if not beneficial, to the surface water
system."0 Other plans have increased stream flow in one basin to the
detriment of another by using water diverted out of the so-called
basin-of-origin to satisfy seniors in the receiving basin.
Many
augmentation plans, however, rely on releases from water in storage to
satisfy seniors. In these cases, the water in storage is almost invariably
captured during snowmelt runoff, thus denying the river system the
benefits of high water, or seasonal flood, periods.3
Wringing ever more water out of the system is certainly consistent
with the state policy enunciated in the Act of "maximum utilization" of
Colorado's waters."2 As the supreme court noted in construing this
new tool for water users, "the fact that the rivers involved are overappropriated, rather than being an argument against the plans for
augmentation, is the very reason for the valid exercise of ingenuity of

26. Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 92.
27. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 44.
28. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(5) (1999); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(9) (1999) (originally defining a plan for augmentation as "a detailed program...
to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use ... by the development of
new or alternate means or points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by
water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the development
of new sources of water, or by any other appropriate means."); Cache LaPoudre Water
Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 293 (Colo. 1976) (upholding the
validity of the plans for augmentation).
29. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 28.
30. The overall environmental effect of these plans is less clear given the quick
depletion of ground water that took eons to accumulate.
31. See generally Poff, supra note 6.
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999).
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One

contemporaneous analysis of this new "major tool" in the Act
described the effect of augmentation plans as allowing a water "user
[to] propose an operation which increases his own supply to the
detriment of no one. 04
From an ecological perspective, however, it is simply a fallacy that
additional depletions that do not adversely affect any other water user
are to the "detriment of no one." Such further depletions in an
already over-appropriated stream may, all too often, harm the aquatic
environment that the water in the river sustained, particularly if the
compensation comes at the expense of the seasonal flow variations that
a natural environment needs. The loss of water may adversely affect
both the economic value (as a result of diminishing recreational use,
such as boating or angling) and the environmental or social value of
the natural system (for example, if the injured stream might otherwise
have sustained a wild trout fishery or endangered fish habitat). Thus,
the further depletions that augmentation plans allow are to the
detriment of the river itself and to these values. 5 Yet, at the time of
their creation (and perhaps still), augmentation plans were seen as a
way to develop "new water from the elimination of waste in the natural
stream system.5 6 In fact, one example given was to drain a bog. If
nothing else, the last thirty years have demonstrated that there are
powerful reasons not to destroy more of this
nation's wetlands,
8
particularly to provide water for inefficient users.3
In creating augmentation plans, the Act took a strikingly different
approach from that in other Western states that adhere to the prior
appropriation system. The states of Washington, Idaho, and Montana,
for example, have closed over-appropriated river basins to additional
depletions by agency-imposed moratoria or by statutory fiat5 9 Such
closures protect both existing users and the remainder of the riverine
environment. In some instances, these closures may also favor the
33. Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304

(Colo. 1976).

34. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, 28 & 38.
35. See generally Poff, supra note 6.
36. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 41.
37. Id. The Clean Water Act, passed in 1972, made it more difficult to drain a bog
by adding the requirement of obtaining a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
38. There is, of course, no requirement that an applicant for an augmentation plan
demonstrate that the new use will utilize the water efficiently or that it will benefit
anyone other than the applicant.
39. In the State of Washington, this can happen pursuant to a statutory process. See
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.38 & 90.42 (1992). In 1999, the state closed the Yakima River
basin. In Idaho, the state's Department of Water Resources recently extended
moratoria on new depletions in the Salmon and Clear Water Rivers that the
Department initially ordered in 1993; the Idaho legislature statutorily closed the Snake
River Plain by statute. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1806 (1996) (null and void December 31,

1997) (a moratorium the Department extended administratively). In Montana, the
legislature adopted a basin-specific statute in 1999 to close the Bitterroot basin to
further water development. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-344 (1999). This legislation
passed with the support of most agricultural users in the valley.
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existing economy, for example, existing agriculture over new housing
developments." In Colorado, irrespective of the Act, some, if not
most, water lawyers would argue that closing a river to further
appropriation is unconstitutional because Colorado's Constitution
proclaims "[t]he right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied., 4' Given that
the constitutional right is limited to unappropriated waters, it is
unclear whether this argument would prevail before the supreme
court. However, regardless of how such a case would turn out, it is
highly unlikely that the state legislature would adopt laws to effect
basin closures. Thus, the drafters of the Act's decision to choose
further depletions over protection of over-appropriated streams will
remain a feature of Colorado water law in the foreseeable future, with
all its attendant adverse environmental consequences.
IV. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION, BENEFICIAL USE, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST

Colorado's Constitution declares that "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado,
is... the property of the public and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation. ' 4' Notwithstanding
this provision, Colorado water law is and always has been the province
of those who divert water for use out of the stream; nothing in the Act
changed this fundamental construct. 4 Colorado has never-before, in,
or since the Act-adopted an express "public interest" test through
which to screen the determination of what constitutes a beneficial use,
or of whether an applicant is entitled to a water right decree. In fact,
the supreme court has rejected any implicit public interest test as a
result of the constitution's declaration that the public owns the water.
Thus, the court has held that, "a public interest argument is not a valid
objection to a decree for a new conditional water right because such
an argument conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation."44 The
Act does not define the term "beneficial use" when applied to
diversionary uses to include any consideration of the societal
consequences of the use, whether good or bad; the only limit on what
constitutes a beneficial use is that the water not be wasted.45
What the legislature did codify was the doctrine of "maximum

40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-344 (1999) (The situation facing traditional water
users in Montana's Bitterroot valley that led to the legislation).
41. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 6; Carlson, supra note 8, at 322.
42. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
43. In fact, one water expert opined that the Colorado public's right to water was
antithetical to the state's system of prior appropriation. Carlson, supra note 8, at 320321.
44. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands, 929 P.2d 718, 725 (Colo.
1996) (quoting In re Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972-73
(Colo. 1995)).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999).
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utilization" of state waters. 46 This doctrine encourages water use, as it
is not limited either by a public interest screen or any requirement
that the holders of water rights conserve water to the maximum extent
possible. Moreover, the policy is a keystone to Colorado's system in
which the environment almost always loses water to its detriment,
regardless of the social benefits of a particular water diversion. 7
In a pivotal decision holding that cutting down certain trees
(phreatophytes) does not produce developed water free from the
priority system, the Colorado Supreme Court limited the doctrine of
maximum utilization.4 ' The court used language implying that the
doctrine of maximum utilization and water law in general should not
be used to ravage the state's natural resources. "Efficacious use does
not mean uplifting one natural resource to the detriment of
another., 49 At the same time, however, the court exhibited a striking
hostility towards the water needs of the environment, calling the
cottonwood trees lining irrigation ditches "water thieves" and
lamentin0 its inability to allow a water user to reclaim the water these
trees use.
The supreme court suggested that the doctrine of maximum
utilization must be balanced with other societal objectives, such as
environmental protection. Thus, the court stated that "the objective of
'maximum use' administration is 'optimum use.' Optimum use can
only be achieved with proper regard for all significant factors,
including environmental and economic concerns."5 However, while

the court has cautioned against using the policy of maximum

46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999). "[I]t is the policy of this state to
integrate the appropriation, use, and administration of underground water tributary
to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize the beneficial
use of all of the waters of this state." Id.
47. The one component of Colorado water law that allows some protection of the
natural environment is the state's instream flow program, which the legislature created
in 1973. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999). Through this program, the
Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB" or "Board") is authorized to
appropriate water "for minimum stream flows.., to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree." Id. For the most part, unfortunately, the program is severely
limited in the quality of the environmental protection it can provide. With few
exceptions, the CWCB's rights are quite junior. In addition, the Board subordinates
to undecreed uses; the amounts of water that the Board can claim are minimum, not
optimum flows; and the Board has limited its appropriations almost exclusively for
protection of cold water fisheries. Moreover, the Board has no field personnel and
quite limited equipment to monitor its rights; thus, enforcement rarely occurs.
48. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d
1321(Colo. 1975). The court seemed particularly concerned that to approve Shelton
Farms' application, given the source of water, would lead to a future where too many
users had water rights free from call, threatening Colorado's prior appropriation
system. Id. at 1326.
49. Id. at 1327; see also City of Thornton v. Biou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91
(Colo. 1996) (water judges must consider potential impact of water use on other
resources).
50. Id. at 1325.
51. Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935
(Colo. 1983).
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utilization to wring every drop of water from our rivers for diversionary
uses, the court has also consistently refused to consider environmental
impacts in individual cases.5 Rather, the court found that the state's
instream flow protection program constituted the state-wide balance
between the policies of maximum utilization and environmental
protection 5
Ironically, at the same time that Colorado adopted the Act, a
National Water Commission ("the Commission") was examining the
nation's water policies, including states' water law systems. 4 Not
surprisingly, the Commission recommended a different approach
from that which Colorado adopted. To promote the "efficient,
equitable and environmentally responsible management of its water
resources," the Commission noted five legislative actions aimed at
protecting instream values:
(1) reserving portions of streams from development and setting
them aside as "wild rivers;"
(2) authorizing a public agency to file for and acquire rights in
unappropnated water;
(3) setting minimum streamflows and lake levels;
(4)
(5)

establishing environmental criteria for the granting of permits
to use water; [and]
forbidding the alteration of watercourses without State

consent.
In the aftermath of the Act's passage, Colorado's Governor
apparently sought advice regarding how to respond to the
Commission's work. The report he received observed that "Colorado
water law is ... vulnerable to the criticism ...

that state law is

wrongheaded in its failure to provide recognition for the social values
of water."56 This report also noted that Colorado law did not
"recognize the possibility that appropriators [could] seek to develop
water rights which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are
none-the-less socially undesirable for the public at large. 57 The
report recognized that Colorado's water law system, as embodied in
the Act, "assumes that58 all growth and development give rise to
beneficial uses of water.
52.

Compare Alamosa-La Jara, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983) with Board of County

Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 952 (Colo. 1995); Aspen Wilderness
Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands, 929 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1996); Bijou Irrigation Co., 926
P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
53. RJA, Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n, 690 P.2d 823, 828 (1984); see also Alamosa-La
Jara,674 P.2d 914, and Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952.
54. UNITED STATES NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES

FOR THE FUTURE:
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1973).

The Commission convened in 1968 pursuant to National Water Commission Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868.
55. Id. at 228.
56. Carlson, supra note 8, at 301.
57. Id.at 324.
58. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
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The report rejected most of the Commission's recommendations
as either unconstitutional or antithetical to Colorado's system of prior
appropriation.9 However, the report concluded that Colorado could
address the Commission's underlying concerns. First, the state could
vigorously prosecute waste and the application of water to nonbeneficial uses by existing users. Second, to control new uses the state
could establish legislative standards to define the public interest in
what constitutes a beneficial use. In addition, the state could create a
new agency to assert the public interest in water court proceedings. 6
Unfortunately, Colorado has ignored the second and third
recommendations entirely. With regard to the first, prosecuting waste,
the Act was of little help and there have been few such cases in the
intervening thirty years. While the effective regulation of waste
requires legal quantification of every water right by calculating
volumetric limits, the Act only defines waste qualitatively, in terms of
beneficial use.61 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the
"owner of a water right has no right as against a junior appropriatorto
waste water, i.e., to divert more than can be used beneficially. 62 Thus,
where the injury falls only on the stream itself, and not on a junior
water rights holder,6 3 it is unclear how Colorado law provides for
curtailment of the waste.
Not only has the Act proved ineffective in stopping waste, but it
also works to discourage active conservation. This is notwithstanding
its definition of beneficial use: "the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is
lawfully made." 64 While some cases do address what constitutes a
reasonable means of diversion, no published cases interpret the phrase
59. Id. at 328-30. For example, the report asserted that allowing a public agency to
file for unappropriated water and setting minimum stream flows would be
unconstitutional. Id. at 529. As noted above, it was to the surprise of many in
Colorado's water community that the Supreme Court ruled the state instream flow
program constitutional in 1979. See Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Colorado
Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
60. Carlson, supra note 8, at 347-48.
61. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 31. In the two supreme court cases
addressing waste handed down in the intervening thirty years, the court noted that a
water right is "limited to an amount sufficient for the purpose for which the
appropriation was made, even though such limitation may be less than the decreed
rate of diversion." Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo.
1981); see also Weibert v. Rothe Brothers, Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Colo. 1980).
However, it is also the case that many types of decrees in Colorado include express
volumetric limits. Groundwater and storage decrees always do, and change of use
cases result in decrees limited to a quantified historic use. SeeJames Corbridge, 69U.
COLO. L. REV. 503, 525 (1998); Farmers Highline Canal v. Golden, Case No. 97SA343
(Colo. Mar. 3, 1999). The lack of volumetric limits thus arises primarily when dealing
with older, original (i.e. unchanged) rights.
62. Weibert, 618 P.2d at 1371 (emphasis added); see also Rominiecki, 633 P.2d at 1067.
63. Relaxed enforcement against waste has adverse consequences for water users
generally because it results in excess evaporation, time delays, and unnecessary
curtailments. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 32.
64. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999).
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"reasonably efficient practices." The two concepts are not identical.
Thus, for example, some irrigators hold rights and divert water
through a reasonable structure, but in a quantity well in excess of the
duty of water for their crops.65
Where the Colorado Supreme Court has examined issues related
to conservation, its holdings offer little support for conservation
The Act codified the requirement that users effect a
values.
"reasonable means of effectuating... diversion." 6 However, the court
found that changing a senior water user's method of diversion could
be the financial responsibility of a junior appropriator, because
neither the court nor the State Engineer can force senior
appropriators "to improve their extraction facilities beyond their
economic reach. 67 With the financial burden shifted, a senior has
little incentive even to conserve the quantity diverted, let alone its
Moreover, without express statutory incentives to
application.
conserve, the manner in which Colorado values a water right at the
time of sale (based on historic use) provides a powerful disincentive to
68
conserve.
In its cases discussing water that may be used outside the priority
court has distinguished "developed" from
system, the supreme
"salvaged" water.68 While a user may take full advantage of developed
water, the same is not true for salvaged water, which is merely tributary
to the stream. Even if salvaged water would not have been available for
use but for the actions of the person seeking a right to its use, because
the water was none-the-less tributary to the stream, the user who freed
it for use cannot claim a right to use outside the priority system. Thus,
the water simply returns to the stream and is available for use in
priority. Ironically, it has been in the context of salvaged water that
the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized the adverse
environmental impacts of water development, rather than conceding
that those same adverse impacts arise from virtually every diversion.7'
65. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 19 n.56.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(2) (b) (1999); see also Colorado Springs v. Bender,
366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961).
67. Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 931, 935
(Colo. 1983) (citing Bender, 366 P.2d 552).
68. See Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977, 980
(Colo. 1981).
69. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 529 P.2d 1321,
1325 (Colo. 1974).
70. Id.; see also Giffen v. Colorado, 690 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo. 1984); RJA, Inc. v.
Water Users Ass'n, 690 P.2d 823, 825-26 (Colo. 1984). By citing these cases, the author
in no way indicates approval of the tactics that the applicants were using to develop
water. In fact, in each case the applicants' practices-draining marshes and cutting
down trees-adversely affected the natural environment.
71. In RJA, Inc., the applicant drained a marsh to provide augmentation water.
RJA, Inc. 690 P.2d at 824. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the
application on the grounds that the marsh was a tributary to the stream and therefore
the water saved did not qualify as development water. Id. at 825-26. The court went
on to note that, "[a]lteration of natural conditions and vegetation in order to save
water carries with it the potential for adverse effects on soil and bank stability, soil
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Ultimately, in Colorado, the "use it or lose it" doctrine of the prior
appropriation system prevails. One notable exception is that the state
encourages municipalities and other urban water providers to
conserve water.7 For the most part, all other users are likely to be
penalized by investing in conservation, because they do not receive any
benefit for such an outlay since the water conserved returns to the
river only to be diverted by other water users in priority. Since a water
user may not sell or convert the water conserved, whether to another
diversionary use or to maintenance or restoration of the aquatic
environment, there is no incentive for conservation. In this respect,
Colorado again differs from her sister prior appropriation states.
Oregon, for example, allows a user who conserves to sell or convert
seventy-five percent of the conserved water provided that the user
dedicates the other portion to instream flow protection. ,7
V. CONCLUSION

The Act has undoubtedly worked well for traditional entities that
divert and use water. The system has proved flexible to accommodate
new beneficial uses. 7" But notwithstanding the public's ownership in
and great interest in preserving the water resource, the Act
perpetuates a system that does not incorporate all public values into
water allocation decision-making; does not welcome public
participation in the determination of water rights; and allows everincreasing adverse effects on natural river environments. Meanwhile,
Colorado's population explodes. 5 Its citizens worry about growth.76
Polls also show that its citizens value natural resource and
environmental protection. 77 Whether the system the Act underlies can
or should continue unreformed is the real question that those
interested in Colorado's water resources must address at the dawn of
the millennium.

productivity, wildlife habitat, fisheries production, water quality, watershed protection
and the hydrologic cycle." Id. at 828.
72. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-124 to -127 (1999).
73. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455 to .500 (1997).
74. And even some non-diversionary instream uses beyond what the CWCB can do.
See City of Thornton v. City of Ft. Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992).
75. Colorado's state demographer estimates that the state will grow to more than
five and a half million residents by the year 2020, from around four million now.
Colorado Department of Local Affairs, County and State PopulationProjects(lastmodified
July 1, 1998) <http://www.dlg.oem2.state.co.us/demog/project.htm>.
76. Because growth is at the top of the list of concerns, plans for growth control top
the state's political agenda as well. See, e.g., Mark Eddy, Growing Smarter: Owens Unveils
Plan to Ward Off Runaway Sprawl, DENVER PosT, Nov. 30, 1999, at B-i; Renata Robey,
Ideas Bandied at Growth Summit, DENVER POsT, Dec. 9, 1999; Mark Eddy, Blocking Dams
Won't End Growth, Ex-Senator Says, DENVER PosT, Dec. 3, 1999, at B-6.
77. See Pamela Case & Gregory Alward, Patterns of Demographic,Economic, and Value
Change in the Western United States, USDA FOREST SERVICE 17-24(1997) (appendix to the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Committee Report).

